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NOTES
The Court correctly held that the two provisions were comple-
mentary rather than inconsistent, and that the more general
amendment did not repeal the nearly absolute terms of the im-
port-export clause insofar as intoxicating liquors are concerned.
26
Alex Williams Rankin
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-DISCRIMINATION IN PUBLIC
ACCOMMODATIONS
The constitutionality of the public accommodations section
of the Civil Rights Act of 19641 as applied to a motel and a
restaurant was attacked in two recent Supreme Court cases. In
the first case, plaintiff, owner of a motel serving out-of-state
guests but refusing to rent rooms to Negroes, asked for declara-
tory and injunctive relief and contended that in passing the act
Congress exceeded its power to regulate commerce and that
the act resulted in a taking of liberty and property without the
due process of law guaranteed by the fifth amendment in that
plaintiff was deprived of the right to choose his customers and
operate his business as he wished. The defendant counter-
claimed for enforcement. The district court sustained this sec-
tion of the act and issued a permanent injunction restraining
plaintiff from further violation of the act. On appeal, the Su-
preme Court affirmed. Held, there was a rational basis for
Congress to conclude that discrimination in lodging establish-
ments has such an adverse effect on interstate commerce as to
make it a proper object of congressional regulation under the
commerce clause. Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379
U.S. 241 (1964).
In the second case, plaintiff, operator of a family-owned
restaurant catering to local family and white-collar trade, re-
fused to serve Negroes. The restaurant did not serve transient
guests, but forty-six percent of food purchased had been pro-
cured from out of state. Plaintiff asked for injunctive relief
and attacked the constitutionality of the public accommoda-
tions section as applied to his restaurant on the ground that
26. Since judicial interpretation appears settled at the present, it seems that
those states that wish to constitutionally tax foreign liquor should attempt to
obtain congressional consent for such an imposition. Under the inport-expor'
clause, a statute by Congress would be sufficient.
1. 78 Stat. 243 (1964), 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (1965).
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Congress did not have a rational basis for finding that racial
discrimination in restaurants in which a substantial portion of
the food served was procured from out of state imposed a bur-
den upon interstate commerce. The district court granted in-
junctive relief on the ground that no connection was shown
between food purchased in interstate commerce and sold in a
restaurant and the congressional conclusion that discrimination
in such restaurants would affect commerce. On appeal, the Su-
preme Court reversed. Held, Congress had a rational basis for
concluding that discrimination in restaurants procuring a sub-
stantial amount of food in interstate commerce has a sufficient
effect on interstate commerce to justify regulation by Congress
under the commerce clause. Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S.
294 (1964).
The only prior cases dealing with attempted congressional
regulation of public accommodations were the Civil Rights
Cases,2 which arose under the Civil Rights Act of 1875.8 This
act was based upon the thirteenth and fourteenth amendments
rather than the commerce power and was held invalid as the
fourteenth amendment applies to state action only and not to
individual activities. The Act of 1964, on the other hand, is
based upon the power of 'Congress to regulate commerce between
the states, and the power to make all laws necessary and proper
for carrying into effect the powers vested in Congress by the
Constitution. The use of the commerce clause as the legal basis
for the act permits regulation of individual activities without
the need for finding state action.
The pertinent provision of the Act of 1964 states that all
persons shall be entitled to the full enjoyment of places of public
accommodation without discrimination or segregation because
of race.4 Generally, a place of public accommodation comes
within the meaning of the act if its operations affect commerce
or if discrimination by it is supported by state action. 5 In par-
2. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
3. Civil Rights Act of 1875, ch. 114, § 1, 18 Stat. 335.
4. 78 Stat. 243 (1964), 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(a) (1965) : "All persons shall be
entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges,
advantages, and accommodations of any place of public accommodation, as defined
in this section, without discrimination or segregation on the ground of race, color,
religion, or national origin."
5. Ibid., id. at (b) : "Each of the following establishments which serves the
public is a place of public accommodation within the meaning of this title if its




ticular, a lodging establishment is included if it serves transient
guests,6 and a restaurant is included if it serves interstate travel-
ers or if a substantial portion of the food it serves has moved in
commerce.7
In the Civil Rights Cases,8 Justice Bradley stated that "no
one will contend that the power to pass it [the Act of 1875]
was contained in the Constitution before the adoption of the
last three amendments" 9 (thirteenth, fourteenth and fifteenth),
yet, less than a century later, the commerce clause was relied
upon to support legislation similar to that attempted in 1875.
This was possible because the commerce clause has been ex-
panded, through judicial interpretation, to embrace almost all
activities which exert some influence on interstate commerce. 10
The courts will not uphold regulation of purely local activities,"
that is, those completely within a particular state that do not
affect other states.' 2 However, the activity governed need not
be substantial, since a large number of small effects will exert
a great influence,' 3 nor is it necessary that the activity have
a direct connection with commerce.' 4  Guided by these prin-
ciples, the Court has held that the amount of wheat a farmer
may grow for his own consumption, 5 the activities of a night-
6. Ibid., id. at (b) (1) : "(A]ny inn, hotel, motel, or other establishment which
provides lodging to transient guests."
7. Ibid., id. at (c) (2) : "[I]t serves or offers to serve interstate travelers or
a substantial portion of the food which it serves, or gasoline or other products
which it sells, has moved in commerce."
8. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
9. Id. at 10.
10. See United States v. Women's Sportswear Mfg. Ass'n, 336 U.S. 460(1949) ; Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) ; United States v. Darby, 312
U.S. 100 (1941) ; NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) ;
Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470 (1917) ; Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S.
321 (1903).
11. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) ; Houston, E. & W. Texas
Ry. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342 (1914) ; Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.)
1 (1824).
12. See Houston, E. & W. Texas Ry. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342 (1914)
Wabash, St. Louis & Pac. Ry. v. Illinois, 118 U.S. 557 (1886) ; The Daniel Ball,
77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557 (1870) ; Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
13. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 127 (1942): "That appellee's own
contribution to the demand for wheat may be trivial by itself is not enough to
remove him from the scope of federal regulation where as here, his contribution,
taken together with that or many other similarly situated, is far from trivial."
14. Id. at 125: "But even if appellee's activity be local and though it may
not be regarded as commerce, it may still, whatever its nature,. be reached by
Congress if it exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce, and
this irrespective of whether such effect is what might at some earlier time have
been defined as 'direct' or 'indirect'."
15. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942). Appellee marketed wheat
in excess of his marketing quota and the Court held that he must pay the penalty
prescribed by the Agricultural Adjustment Act even though the amount of excess
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watchman of a manufacturing plant,16 and the services of an
independent window washing company for an industrial con-
cern 17 had sufficient influence upon interstate commerce to
bring them within the scope of regulation. Moreover, the move-
ment of persons from one state to another,"' including non-
commercial movement, 19 has been held to be encompassed within
the commerce power. In addition, activity which is not in itself
commerce has been regulated when it produces an effect on
commerce, regardless of the source of the effect.20
In Heart of Atlanta,21 the motel was subject to the Civil
Rights Act under the provision that a motel which discriminates
among transient guests adversely affects interstate commerce."
The court in rebutting the argument that the act violated the
requirement of due process, relied upon congressional findings
that such discrimination had the effect of "discouraging travel
on the part of a substantial portion of the Negro community,"2'
and that this effect also extended to air travel. The contention
that Congress was legislating against a social and moral wrong
was given no weight, since the Court will not inquire into the
motives behind legislation once it is found that ,Congress has the
power to regulate. There is support in the jurisprudence for
this rule, for previously legislation which standing alone would
have been invalid has been upheld when the activity to be regu-
lated was found to have an effect on interstate commerce. 2 '
wheat was trivial. The Court reasoned that by growing the excess the appellee
would purchase less wheat and further that many such insignificant amounts
would, when taken together, produce a great effect on the wheat market.
16. See Walton v. Southern Package Corp., 320 U.S. 540, 543 (1944). Here
a night watchman was employed by a manufacturer of lumber shipped in interstate
commerce. Although not directly concerned with the manufacturing process the
court said that he had that "close and immediate tie with the process of produc-
tion for commerce," so as to bring him under the provisions of the Fair Labor
Standards Act.
17. Martino v. Michigan Window Cleaning Co., 327 U.S. 173 (1946). An
independent window washing concern's activities were deemed to be necessary to
the production of the goods produced in the plants serviced, so as to bring the
window washers under the Fair Labor Standards Act.
18. See Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373 (1946); Hoke v. United States,
227 U.S. 308 (1913) ; Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283 (1849).
19. See Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470 (1917).
20. See Martino v. Michigan Window Cleaning Co., 327 U.S. 173 (1946)
Walton v. Southern Package Corp., 320 U.S. 540 (1944) ; United States v. Darby,
312 U.S. 100 (1941) ; Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470 (1917).
21. 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
22. 78 Stat. 243 (1964), 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b)(1) (1965). See notes 5 and
6 supra and accompanying text.
23. 379 U.S. 241, 253 (1964).
24. See United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941); NLRB v. Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) ; Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S.
470 (1917) ; Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321 (1903).
NOTES
The Court concluded that Congress had a reasonable basis for
finding that discrimination and segregation in lodging estab-
lishments had an adverse effect upon interstate commerce and
that the means of regulation selected by Congress were reason-
ably adapted to the ends permitted by the Constitution.
The McClung case25 challenged the provision of the act that
a restaurant affects interstate commerce if a substantial portion
of the food it serves has moved in interstate commerce 26 even
though the restaurant does not serve interstate travelers. The
report of the Senate Commerce Committee, 27 upon which the
Court heavily relied, revealed that racial segregation and dis-
crimination reduced spending by Negroes in segregated areas,
and since this resulted in fewer purchases, interstate commerce
was adversely affected. There was also testimony to the effect
that such discrimination imposed an artificial restrictiion on the
market and resulted in wide unrest and generally depressant
effects on business conditions in segregated communities. Fur-
ther, a claim was made that such discrimination had the effect
of restricting interstate travel by Negroes, since they were not
assured of service in restaurants. The activity of the restaurant
in question seemingly had no direct effect on interstate com-
merce, as there was no showing that interstate travelers were
customers. The Court reasoned, however, that since segregated
'conditions caused the restaurant to serve fewer customers, the
restaurant would consequently buy less food in interstate com-
merce. By contrast, in the case of Heart of Atlanta, the Court
stated that the public accommodations section of the Civil Rights
Act "is carefully limited to enterprises having a direct and sub-
stantial relation to the interstate flow of goods and people. ' 28
Evidently the Court used the above testimony to try to establish
a significant connection with interstate commerce in the case
of the restaurant. The fact that the restaurant was a local
activity alleged to have little effect when compared to the total
volume of foodstuffs moving in commerce was held to be not
relevant.2 9
The McClung case raises an interesting question as to what
25. Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
26. 78 Stat. 243 (1964), 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(c) (2) (1965). See notes 5 and 7
upra.
27. S. Rep. No. 872, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1964).
28. 379 U.S. 241, 250 (1964).




activities the act was meant to cover. The act states that a
restaurant is included if a "substantial portion of the food
which it serves" has moved in interstate commerce.30 This sug-
gests that the determination might be made on the percentage
of interstate food each restaurant serves, regardless of total
volume. The Court, however, does not make its interpretation
clear. At times, it seems to consider that seventy thousand dol-
lars worth of food is a substantial portion ;31 at others it implies
that the determination should be on a percentage basis.32 Other
parts of the act manifest an intent not to regulate smaller con-
cerns. For example, lodging establishments with fewer than
five rooms are exempted, when the proprietor actually resides
in the building.3 It is not clear whether small or local restau-
rants would be covered, although Justice Black, in his con-
curring opinion in Heart of Atlanta, feels that they would not.4
Although at first these two cases may seem to be an exten-
sion of the commerce power, the jurisprudence does not support
this impression. It is true that a new area, public accommoda-
tions, has come under the regulation of Congress, but regulation
of individual activities not in themselves commerce, but in some
way associated with it, have been consistently upheld as a valid
exercise of the commerce power. The Court previously has up-
held legislation eliminating discrimination by employers against
employees who were members of labor unions,3 legislation estab-
lishing maximum hours and minimum wages,3 6 regulation of the
amount of wheat a man can grow,3 7 and establishment of intra-
state rates of interstate carriers.33 Similarly, cases have elimi-
nated discrimination in interstate transportation 9 and upheld
30. 78 Stat. 243 (1964), 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(c) (2) (1965).
31. 379 U.S. 294, 298 (1964) : "The sole question, therefore, narrows down
to whether Title II, as applied to a restaurant receiving about $70,000 worth
of food which has moved in commerce, is a valid exercise of the power of
Congress."
32. Id. at 304: "The only remaining question-one answered in the affirmative
by the court below-is whether the particular restaurant either serves or offers
to serve interstate travelers or serves food a substantial portion of which has
moved in interstate commerce."
33. 78 Stat. 243 (1964), 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b) (1) (1965).
34. 379 U.S. 241, 275 (1964) : "I recognize too that some isolated and remote
lunch room which sells only to local people and buys almost all its supplies in
the locality may possibly be beyond the reach of the power of Congress to regulate
commerce, just as such an establishment is not covered by the present Act."
35. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
36. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
37. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
38. Houston, E. & W. Texas Ry. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342 (1914).
39. Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373 (1946).
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the validity of state anti-discrimination legislation. 40 It was but
a short step for the Court, under the prior jurisprudence, to
bring the regulation of public accommodations within the ambit
of the commerce power.
James F. Abadie
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - RELIGIOUS BELIEF NECESSARY FOR
CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTOR EXEMPTION
Seeger claimed exemption as a conscientious objector under
section 6(j) of the Universal Military Training and Service
Act, which exempts from combatant duty in the Armed Forces
of the United States those persons who by reason of their re-
ligious belief are conscientiously opposed to participation in
war.' Seeger's conscientious objections were based on a belief
in and devotion to goodness and virtue for their own sake, and
a religious faith in a purely ethical creed. His local Selective
Service Board found his beliefs to be sincere and honest but
denied Seeger's claim because it was not based upon a "belief
in a relation to a Supreme Being" as required by the act. In
fact, Seeger was unwilling to assert or deny the existence of a
Deity. He refused to submit to induction and was subsequently
convicted in a federal district court.2 The Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit reversed on the grounds that the statute
limiting the conscientious objection to persons who believe in a
Supreme Being violated the due process clause of the fifth
amendment by creating an impermissible classification between
internally derived and externally compelled beliefs as applied
to one whose abhorrence of war was sincere and predicated on
religious training and belief.3 The Supreme Court granted cer-
tiorari 4 and affirmed the result, but did not pass on the con-
40. Bob-Lo Excursion Co. v. Michigan, 333 U.S. 28 (1948).
1. 72 Stat. 711 (1958), 50 U.S.C. §456(J) (1964): "Nothing contained in
this title . . . shall be construed to require any person to be subject to combatant
training and service . . . who, by reason of religious training and belief, is con-
scientiously opposed to participation in war in any form. Religious training and
belief in this connection means an individual's belief in relation to a Supreme
Being involving duties superior to those arising from any human relation, but
does not include essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views of a
merely personal moral code."
2. United States v. Seeger, 216 F. Supp. 516 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
3. United States v. Seeger, 326 F.2d 846 (2d Cir. 1964).
4. Certiorari was also granted in two other cases: United States v. Peter, 324
F.2d 173 (9th Cir. 1963); United States v. Jakobson, 325 F.2d 409 (2d Cir.
1965]
